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WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
fire which crosses the state line,24 owning a a vicious dog which strays
over the state line,25 or shipping a negligently manufactured coffee
urn across the state line.2 6 By the rule of conflicts of laws, the defen-
dant Titan's liability is measured by the domestic laws of Illinois27
to the same extent as if it had acted within the state.
Since Illinois law would be applied in the Gray case as a matter
of choice of law it seems plausible that Illinois courts should have
jurisdiction to make this application. The fact that Illinois law is the
law applicable in the Gray case in and of itself provides the neces-
sary minimum contact to permit Illinois to exercise judicial jurisdic-
tion under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
MALCOLM LASSMAN
MINERAL LESSEE'S RIGHT TO STRIP MINE
There are two general methods of mining: underground or deep
mining' and surface or strip mining.2 The use of strip mining has
always been limited by the thickness and character of the overlying
strata. However, the development of modern earth-moving equipment
and new mining techniques permit the application of strip mining
to mineral deposits which could previously be mined only by the
more conventional undergound method. While strip mining may
severely damage the surface, it does not necessarily render it entirely
useless. Deep mining may or may not cause damage to the overlying
surface, depending upon whether a sufficient amount of the mineral
deposit is left in place to maintain adequate support.
The different effects that deep mining and strip mining have upon
the surface are of great importance in determining the rights of the
parties to a mineral lease that severs the surface ownership and mineral
rights. These effects become even more significant if the lease agree-
2Otey v. Midland Valley Ry., io8 Kan. 755, 197 Pac. 203 (1921).
- Le Forest v. Tolman, 117 Mass. iog (1875).
mReed & Barton Corp. v. Maas, 73 F.2d 359 (ist Cir. 1934).
"See note 23 supra.
'Deep mining involves the sinking of shafts or the driving of slopes or drifts
from the surface into the mineral deposit and the underground development of
entries or galleries from which the mineral is removed for transportation to the
surface.
2"Strip mining is done from the surface of the earth. In general, it is per-
formed by stripping off the earth, known as overburden, which lies over the [min-
eral] and then removing the [mineral] so uncovered." Parsons v. Smith, 359 U.S. 215,
216 (1959).
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ment was executed at a time when one of the mining methods either
was unknown or was not generally accepted in the locality. The prob-
lem most often arises when the mineral lessee finds that, due to
economic conditions or technological improvements, it will be more
profitable to strip mine the mineral than to employ deetp mining. The
surface owner is then faced with the possibility that he will be de-
prived of the use and enjoyment of his land.
In a recent Pennsylvania case, Heidt v. Aughenbaugh Coal Co.,3
the plaintiff sought to enjoin the mineral lessee from strip mining
fire clay. The defendant coal company acquired mining rights under a
1915 mineral lease to its predecessor in title who had deep mined the
fire clay between 1915 and 1926. The plaintiff obtained title to the sur-
face through various devises and conveyances, each of which expressly
excepted and reserved 4 the minerals and mining rights by reference5 to
the 1915 lease. When the plaintiff filed the complaint in ig6o, he was
using the surface for agricultural purposes6 and had posted the land
with "No Trespass" signs. The defendant entered upon the land and
began its strip mining operation. The trial court entered judgment
for the defendant and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed.
Although strip mining of fire clay may have been unknown7 at the
time the mineral lease was executed and although there may have
been implications in the lease that deep mining was contemplated, a
clause in the lease which provided the "right to mine to include all
practical methods now in use, or which may hereafter be used ... and
34o6 Pa. 188, 176 A.2d 400 (1962).
'For the distinction between "exception" and "reservation," see Lauderbach-
Zerby Co. v. Lewis, 283 Pa. 250, 129 AtI. 83 (1925).
5A description of the property transferred may be incorporated by reference to
a prior conveyance. Bland v. Kentucky Coal Corp., 306 Ky. 1, 206 S.W.2d 62 (1947).
OAlthough the plaintiff complained that strip mining would prevent him from
using the land for agricultural purposes, the surface in question was, "in the
relatively near future," to be inundated by the construction of a federal dam.
However, the court said that this fact was "in no sense controlling." 176 A.2d
at 404.
-"Stripping with power shovels really began in 1877 near Pittsburg, Kansas."
Sherwood, Development of Strip Mining, Mining Congress Journal 31 (Nov. 1945).
"The present era of stripping can be said to have begun in about gio with
the successful introduction ... of large, full-revolving shovels in the midwestern
United States." Koenig, Economics and Technique of Strip Coal Mining, Colorado
School of Mines Quarterly 29 (April 195o).
Even though it is probable that mechanized stripping was not used to mine
fire clay until after the lease was executed in 1915, "there is no rule of law which
would preclude defendant, having the right to mine the [mineral], from using
methods for that purpose made possible by modern machinery and inventions."
Commonwealth v. Fisher, 364 Pa. 422, 72 A.2d 568, 570 (1950).
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the right to strip the surface..." was sufficient to grant the mineral
lessee the right to strip mine for fire clay.
The plaintiff argued that, with the exception of this one provision,
virtually all the language in the lease implied that the parties intend-
ed the fire clay to be removed only by deep mining. However, the
court said that the implications of deep mining were not strong
enough to prevent the lessee from strip mining under the express
covenants of the lease, and that to deny the lessee the right to strip
mine would be to make a new contract.8 The Heidt decision illus-
trates the most obvious basis for determining the mineral lessee's right
to strip mine; i.e., by an express agreement in the lease.
Another basis for establishing the mineral lessee's right to strip
mine is by construing the entire lease to determine the intention9 of
the parties at the time the instrument was executed. When the lan-
guage of a lease is contradictory, obscure or ambiguous, the most
reasonable construction will be adopted.10 Fairness, custom and
usage are considered to determine what is reasonable." Even though
the original parties to the lease are not available, parol evidence
may be introduced to explain ambiguous terms and to give meaning
to expressions by showing the custom and usage at the time the instru-
ment was executed.12 If the instrument is susceptible of two or more
equally reasonable constructions, it will be construed most strongly
against the lessor.'
3
One provision, commornly found in mineral leases, deserves special
consideration. This provision relates to the surface owner's absolute
right to subjacent support.14 Unless the surface owner has either ex-
"The law will not imply a different contract from that which the parties them-
selves made." Mount Carmel R.R. v. M. A. Hanna Co., 371 Pa. 232, 89 A.2d 5o8,
513 (1952).
"'Mhis intention must be deduced, not from specific provisions or fragmen-
tary parts of the instrument, but from its entire context...." Uinta Tunnel, Min-
ing & Transp. Co. v. Ajax Gold Mining Co., 141 Fed. 563, 566 (8th Cir. 19o5).
'Hempfield Township School Dist. v. Cavalier, 3o9 Pa. 46o, 164 Ad. 6o2
(1932); Navarro Corp. v. School Dist. of Pittsburgh, 344 Pa. 429, 25 A.2d 8o8 (1942);
Elliott-Lewis Corp. v. York-Shipley, Inc., 372 Pa. 346, 94 A.2d 47 (1953).
uPercy A. Brown & Co. v. Raub, 357 Pa. 271, 54 A.2d 35 (1947).
',"Evidence to explain ambiguity, establish a custom, or show the meaning of
technical terms, and the like, is not regarded as an exception to the [parol evidence]
rule, because it does not contradict or vary the written instrument...." Thomas
v. Scutt, 127 N.Y. 133, 27 N.E. 961, 963 (i8gi).
"Hunt v. Hunt, 119 Ky. 39, 82 S.W. 998 (19o4); Eastham v. Church, 31o Ky.
93; 219 S.W.9d 4o6 (1949).
"'Clinchfield Coal Corp. v. Compton, 148 Va. 437, 139 S.E. 308 (1927); Couch v.
Clinchfield Coal Corp., 148 Va. 455, 139 S.E. 314 (1927).
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pressly or impliedly waived his right to subjacent support, 15 the min-
eral lessee must carry on his underground mining so as not to disturb
the overlying surface. However, a conveyance that expressly releases
the mineral lessee from liability for damage to the surface is a waiver
of the lessor's right to have his land supported.'; It is also generally
accepted that a grant of the right to mine all the mineral amounts to
an implied waiver of the lessee's duty to maintain subjacent
support.1 7 All the mineral cannot be removed without causing damage
to the surface. Some form of temporary support may be left in place
of the mineral, or the nature of the overlying strata may be such that
subsidence will not take place immediately, but ultimately the min-
ing of all the mineral will necessarily result in some disturbance of
the surface. By this rationale, the lessor who conveys the right to mine
all the mineral will be deemed to have waived his right to subjacent
support, and the mineral lessee is released from liability for damage
to the surface resulting from underground mining.
The courts have not extended this reasoning to the point of hold-
ing that either an express or an implied waiver, standing alone, is
enough to establish the mineral lessee's right to strip mine.'8 It seems
that they have restrained from doing so by adopting a theory that
the right to damage the surface is not the right to destroy the surface.
Strip mining does not necessarily render the surface useless for its
intended purpose.19 Many states have reclamation statutes2 0 which re-
""The modern decisions of both England and America recognize that the right
of subjacent support may be waived either expressly or by necessary implication."
Simmers v. Star Coal & Coke Co., 113 W. Va. 309, 311, 167 S.E. 737 (933)-
'0Stelmack v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 339 Pa. 410, 14 A.2d 127 (1940); Continental
Coal Co. v. Connellsville By-Product Co., 1o4 W. Va. 44, 138 S.E. 737 (1927).
'-Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 179 Fed. 191 (4 th Cir. 1910); Simmers v. Star Coal
& Coke Co., ii 3 W. Va. 309, 167 S.E. 737 (1933)
"8One exception is Commonwealth v. F. & W. Coal Co., 65 Dauph. 157 (Pa.
C.P. 1953). The court held that an implied waiver of the right to subjacent sup-
port carried with it the right to conduct strip mining.
10"[]t has been proven to the hilt that the [mineral] can be [strip] mined and
that the land then can be put back into shape for satisfactory hay and pasture ....
In fact, with proper handling, some land is even better after being turned over
and plowed up." Brohard, Strip Revegetation, Coal Age 64, 65 (March 1962).
The usual reclamation statute requires the strip mine operator to post bond
at a specified rate per acre. If he fails to regrade and replant the stripped area with-
in the designated period after completion of the mining, the bond is forfeited.
In Pennsylvania, the proceeds from forfeited bonds go into the "Bituminous
Coal Open Pit Mining Reclamation Fund" for the purpose of reclaiming stripped
lands in the same county where the liability was charged. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 52, §
1396.18 (1954).
In West Virginia, the forfeitures are deposited in the "Surface Mining Reclama-
tion Fund" and are expended upon the particular land upon which the permit
was issued. W. Va. Code Ann. § 2312(3 5 d) (961).
1962]
280 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XIX
quire the mineral lessee to regrade and replant the stripped area, thus
minimizing the damage. If the land is restored so that it serves a use-
ful purpose, it can hardly be said that the surface has been destroyed.
Furthermore, it is possible that deep mining of all the mineral will
render the surface just as useless as strip mining does.21 If both methods
equally deprive the surface owner of the use and enjoyment of his
land, it does not seem reasonable to deny the mineral lessee the right
to choose the more practical method. It is therefore submitted that,
when the land can be restored and used for its intended purpose or
when either method would result in an equal amount of surface
damage, either an express or an implied waiver of the mineral lessee's
duty to maintain subjacent support should be sufficient to establish
his right to strip mine.
Another provision in mineral leases which merits consideration is
a grant of the right to use and occupy the surface. Here again, the
courts have not interpreted such a provision to include the right to
strip mine, by reasoning that the right to use and occupy the sur-
face does not mean the right to destroy the surface.22 This reasoning
was upheld in West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Strong.23 A ma-
jority of the court denied the mineral lessee the right to strip mine
even though the lease expressly granted the right to mine all the
mineral and strip mining was the only method by which all the min-
eral could be removed.2 4 The one dissenting Judge25 felt that the court
was disregarding an express provision of the lease and thereby depriv-
ing the lessee of a valuable contract right. Although it is conceded that
a grant of the right to use and occupy the surface may not, in itself,
be sufficient to establish the mineral lessee's right to strip mine, it
should add considerable weight to this position. This is especially true
if the surface is rugged mountainous country or barren wasteland.2 6
Every effort must be made to protect the surface owner's right to
use and enjoy his land, but if he has conveyed away this right, he
should not be protected at the expense of the mineral lessee. The
"Where deep mining is conducted without leaving proper subjacent support,
subsidence of the surface may damage the land even more severely than strip min-
ing.
"Barker v. Mintz, 73 Colo. 262, 215 Pac. 534 (1923).
3129 W. Va. 832, 42 S.E.2d 46 (1947).
"WVhere the overburden is relatively thin and consists of loose, unconsolidated
material, strip mining may be the only method by which the mineral can be re-
covered.
"Fox, J., West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.
"Commonwealth v. Fisher, 364 Pa. 422, 72 A.2d 568 (ig5o); Commonwealth
v. Fitzmartin, 376 Pa. 39 o , 102 A.2d 893 (1954).
